| #2895686 in eBooks | 2013-01-22 | 2013-01-22 | File type: PDF|||"A fundamental issue with any concept of equilibrium, including Nash and correlated equilibria, is to define the process by which equilibrium is attained. The work of Professors Hart and Mas-Colell has been the deepest in this area, especially in defining c
This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called regret-matching, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to correlated equilibria. This initial finding — boundedly rational behavior that yields fully rational outcomes in the long run — generated a large body of work...
You can specify the type of files you want, for your device.Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics: 4 (World Scientific Series in Economic Theory) | Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell.Not only was the story interesting, engaging and relatable, it also teaches lessons.
